The 2 reference contexts in paper Motchenkova (2004) “Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability” / RePEc:tiu:tiucen:d6321c1e-b79a-4aae-8ef5-d1d6f24d9403

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    6197
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    This problem also falls into a wider class of models, which analyze optimal policies for the deterrence of violations of antitrust law in the presence of leniency schemes, such as Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2000), Malik (1993) or
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    Hinloopen (2003).
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    In particular, we study the problem of how an additional enforcement instrument, such as a leniency program, influences the stability of cartels under two different regimes offines,fixed and proportional.
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    They conclude that self-reporting may reduce enforcement costs and improve risk-sharing, as risk-averse self-reporting individuals face a certain penalty rather than the stochastic penalty faced by non-reporting violators. A similar paper in this field is
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    Innes (1999),
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    who considers an extension of environmental self-reporting schemes. The use of leniency programs in antitrust has been extensively studied by Motta and Polo (2003). They show that such programs might have an important role in the prosecution of cartels provided thatfirms can apply for leniency after an investigation has started.
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