The 21 references with contexts in paper Jonathan Isham, Michael Woolcock, Lant Pritchett, Gwen Busby (2003) “The Varieties of Resource Experience: How Natural Resource Export Structures Affect the Political Economy of Economic Growth” / RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0308

5
Auty, Richard (1995) Patterns of Development: Resources, Policy and Economic Growth London: Edward Arnold.
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    only is institutional capacity to handle shocks a determinant of economic 5 Columbine-tantalite (Col-tan) has recently been declared ‘the wonder mineral of the moment’: when processed, it is vital for the manufacture of capacitors and other high tech products. 6 The most recent literature on the effects of natural resources on growth includes
    Exact
    Auty 1995;
    Suffix
    2001; Leamer et al 1999; Leite and Weidmann 1999; Ross 1999, 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995 [2000], 1999; Stijns 2001; Nugent and Robinson 2001; Gylfason and Zoega 2002, Lederman and Maloney 2002. growth since the “commodity shocks” of the 1970s and 1980s (Rodrik 1999), but that institutional capacity itself varies across economies with different sources of export revenue, and that it is

6
Auty, Richard (2001) ‘Introduction and overview’, in R.M. Auty (ed.) Resource Abundance and
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    (and beyond) and in the process created functioning democratic polities (although via very different paths—the US/UK path to democracy is very different from the French, Prussian/German, or Japanese one). Indeed, viewed over the span of the last hundred years, it is only quite recently that resource-poor countries have become systematically wealthier than resource-rich countries (see
    Exact
    Auty 2001
    Suffix
    : 5). Political scientists have long argued that states dependent on natural resources tend to thwart secular modernization pressures—e.g. higher levels of urbanization, education, and occupational specialization—because their budget revenues are derived from a small work force that deploys sophisticated technical skills that can only be acquired abroad (e.g., oil is largely extracted

12
Campbell, Greg (2002) Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World’s Most Precious
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    Some have argued that land scarcity is behind the Rwandan conflicts (e.g., Klare, 2001), but resource-rich countries have not escaped civil strife. Angola had been embroiled in conflict since the mid 1970s, and the “problem” there is not scarce land, but rather abundant sources of oil and some of the world’s best diamonds
    Exact
    (Campbell, 2002).
    Suffix
    Just as revenues from diamonds, timber, coffee and gold in the eastern half strengthened (then) Zaire’s elite, revenues from Coltan are now strengthening the rebel Rally for Congolese Democracy5. Rebels in Sierra Leone are financed from diamond mines, and are perhaps fighting over nothing else except for control over them.

39
Karl, Terry (1997) The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
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    Prefix
    will go to schools, hospitals and roads, no formal plans are in the offing; meanwhile, neighboring Caspian Sea nations are despotically ruled, ethnically divided, and weakened by corruption—problems some fear will be made worse by oil4. The controversy over the construction of the pipeline in Chad 1 Cited in Ross (2001: 329, fn. 6) 2
    Exact
    Karl (1997
    Suffix
    : 13) 3 Bates (2001: 107, fn. 1) 4 According to the chief UN representative in Azerbaijan, “This wealth ... will create a lot of problems. It will increase the already substantial gap between the rich and poor, and eventually it will affect political stability” (Kinzer 1999). demonstrates that even in an extraordinarily poor country, not all believe that additional wealth pouring in

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    Where others (e.g., Rodrik 1999) have shown how important institutional quality and social inclusion are to managing growth generally and growth volatility in particular, these results push the chain of causation back further one step further, showing that, pace
    Exact
    Karl (1997
    Suffix
    : 13), “the revenues a state collects, how it collects them, and the uses to which it puts them” does indeed “define its nature”. Institutions surely matter a lot, but types of natural resource endowments and the corresponding export structures to which they give rise (rather than “geography”), play a large role in shaping what kinds of institutional forms exist and persist.

40
Kaufmann, Daniel, Art Kray, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón . (2000). ‘Aggregating Governance Indicators’ Policy Research Working Paper 2195. Washington: The World Bank.
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    There is no question that the manufactures exporters appear to 15 These “institutional” variables that have been used recently in a set of papers on the institutional determinants of economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1995;
    Exact
    Rodrik 1999a, Kaufmann et al. 2000;
    Suffix
    Dollar 2000, Ritzen, Easterly and Woolcock 2000, and Easterly 2001). Growth rate data for the period 1957-1997 was compiled have higher institutional quality—the indicator is lower among the resource-exporter countries in all cases and for six of these this difference is statistically significant 16 .

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    Prefix
    Regulatory burden 0.40 -0.17 -0.14 -0.19 -0.11 ICRGLaw and Order Tradition 3.81 2.85 * 2.80 2.89 2.81 Quality of the Bureaucracy 3.71 2.59 ** 2.52 2.63 2.55 Freedom Political rights 3.98 3.28 3.50 3.26 3.12 House Civil Liberties 3.56 3.35 3.49 3.33 3.24 CPIA Property rights and rulebased governance 3.60 3.37 3.53 3.28 3.42 Notes: The sources for these institutional variables are
    Exact
    Kaufmann et al. (2000)
    Suffix
    (for KKZ), Easterly (2000) (for ICRG and Freedom House) and World Bank (2002) (for CPIA). * significant at 5% level and ** significant at 1% level for Mann-Whitney test of similar distributions in resource-poor and resource-exporter countries.

41
Kaufmann, Daniel, Art Kray, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón . (2002). ‘Governance Matters II’
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=32033
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    Mann-Whitney test of similar distributions in resource-poor and resource-exporter countries. from the Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators (World Bank 1999). Measures of social and political data were adapted from
    Exact
    Kaufmann et al. (2002)
    Suffix
    15, Easterly (2000), and World Bank (2002). 16 From the KKZ data, ‘rule of law’, ‘political instability’, ‘government effectiveness’, and ‘control of corruption’; from ICRG, ‘law and order tradition’ and ‘quality of the bureaucracy.

44
Kinzer, Stephen. (1999) ‘Riches May Roil Caspian Nations’ The New York Times January 2, 1999.
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    Prefix
    of the pipeline in Chad 1 Cited in Ross (2001: 329, fn. 6) 2 Karl (1997: 13) 3 Bates (2001: 107, fn. 1) 4 According to the chief UN representative in Azerbaijan, “This wealth ... will create a lot of problems. It will increase the already substantial gap between the rich and poor, and eventually it will affect political stability”
    Exact
    (Kinzer 1999).
    Suffix
    demonstrates that even in an extraordinarily poor country, not all believe that additional wealth pouring into government coffers will lead to better times. Both resource scarcity and abundance have been cited as a primary cause of civil war.

45
Klare, Michael (2001) Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict New York:
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    Prefix
    eventually it will affect political stability” (Kinzer 1999). demonstrates that even in an extraordinarily poor country, not all believe that additional wealth pouring into government coffers will lead to better times. Both resource scarcity and abundance have been cited as a primary cause of civil war. Some have argued that land scarcity is behind the Rwandan conflicts (e.g.,
    Exact
    Klare, 2001),
    Suffix
    but resource-rich countries have not escaped civil strife. Angola had been embroiled in conflict since the mid 1970s, and the “problem” there is not scarce land, but rather abundant sources of oil and some of the world’s best diamonds (Campbell, 2002).

52
Leamer, Edward, Hugo Maul, Sergio Rodriguez, and Peter Schott (1999) ‘Does natural resource abundance increase Latin American income inequality?’ Journal of Development Economics 59: 3-42
Total in-text references: 3
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    capacity to handle shocks a determinant of economic 5 Columbine-tantalite (Col-tan) has recently been declared ‘the wonder mineral of the moment’: when processed, it is vital for the manufacture of capacitors and other high tech products. 6 The most recent literature on the effects of natural resources on growth includes Auty 1995; 2001;
    Exact
    Leamer et al 1999;
    Suffix
    Leite and Weidmann 1999; Ross 1999, 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995 [2000], 1999; Stijns 2001; Nugent and Robinson 2001; Gylfason and Zoega 2002, Lederman and Maloney 2002. growth since the “commodity shocks” of the 1970s and 1980s (Rodrik 1999), but that institutional capacity itself varies across economies with different sources of export revenue, and that it is these export structures t

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=25530
    Prefix
    The second method was to compute four indices of ‘net export shares’ that mirror our four classifications of the types of exports: (1) manufacturing; (2) diffuse, (3) point source, and (4) coffee and cocoa. To construct these four indices, the World Trade Analyzer from 1980 was used to aggregate SITC codes at the two-digit level into our four export categories, following the approach of
    Exact
    Leamer et al. (1999). To
    Suffix
    calculate the ‘net export share’ for each sub-category, net exports (X-M) of sub-category i is divided by the sum of the absolute value of net exports across all sub-categories (following the procedure in Leamer et al.,1999).

  3. In-text reference with the coordinate start=25761
    Prefix
    To calculate the ‘net export share’ for each sub-category, net exports (X-M) of sub-category i is divided by the sum of the absolute value of net exports across all sub-categories (following the procedure in
    Exact
    Leamer et al.,1999).
    Suffix
    The four indices are then calculated as the sum of the net export shares for each sub-category in each of the four categories. By construction, these indices have a range of –1 to 1, with a higher number indicating a greater relative reliance on the corresponding category for export earnings.

55
Lipset, Seymour Martin (1959) ‘Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy’ American Political Science Review 53:
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    By the same token, citizens have less incentive to create mechanisms of accountability and develop the deep “civil society” and horizontal social associations that many feel are the “preconditions” of democracy
    Exact
    (Lipset (1959), Moore (1966), Putnam (1993), and
    Suffix
    Inglehart (1997)). Second, with the “exogenous” revenues, the government can mollify dissent through a variety of mechanisms (buying off critics, providing the population with benefits, infrastructure projects, patronage or outright graft).

59
Migdal, Joel (1988) Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capacities in the Third World Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
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    Prefix
    Concomitantly, citizens are therefore less able to effectively and peacefully voice their collective interests, preferences, and grievances (even in nominally democratic countries such as Zimbabwe and Jamaica). In short, resource abundance simultaneously “strengthens states” and “weakens societies”, and thus yields—or at least perpetuates—low levels of development (cf.
    Exact
    Migdal 1988).
    Suffix
    9 Entrenched Inequality. The “entrenched inequality” effect is that the export composition affects economic and political outcomes by affecting the social structure. Economic historians Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) argue that the diverging growth trajectories of South and North America over the last two hundred years can be explained by reference to the types of crops grown, the exte

60
Moore, Barrington (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Boston: Beacon Press
Total in-text references: 3
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=11899
    Prefix
    By the same token, citizens have less incentive to create mechanisms of accountability and develop the deep “civil society” and horizontal social associations that many feel are the “preconditions” of democracy
    Exact
    (Lipset (1959), Moore (1966), Putnam (1993), and
    Suffix
    Inglehart (1997)). Second, with the “exogenous” revenues, the government can mollify dissent through a variety of mechanisms (buying off critics, providing the population with benefits, infrastructure projects, patronage or outright graft).

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=12353
    Prefix
    Second, with the “exogenous” revenues, the government can mollify dissent through a variety of mechanisms (buying off critics, providing the population with benefits, infrastructure projects, patronage or outright graft). Third, the state has resources to pursue direct repression and violence against dissenters. Delayed Modernization. For influential scholars such as Barrington
    Exact
    Moore (1966),
    Suffix
    the story of wealth, power, and political and economic transformation begins with some smallish group of elites owning the most valuable resources (usually land); from this land they extract a surplus from the peasants in some way or another (serfdom, slavery, feudal exactions), but then economic circumstances change so that industrialization is necessary.

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    inability to mobilize revenues because of conflicts between sovereign and nobles meant that eventually one got gobbled (classic cases: Poland, Hungary). 8 Acemoglu and Robinson (1999) model precisely these trade-off by the elites. lead to representative democracy, fascism, corporatism, Marxist dictatorships, or oligarchies
    Exact
    (Moore 1966).
    Suffix
    Recently, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) have used similar arguments in which the mortality of settlers plays a crucial role in determining the structure of economic production and hence institutions.

67
Putnam, Robert (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=11899
    Prefix
    By the same token, citizens have less incentive to create mechanisms of accountability and develop the deep “civil society” and horizontal social associations that many feel are the “preconditions” of democracy
    Exact
    (Lipset (1959), Moore (1966), Putnam (1993), and
    Suffix
    Inglehart (1997)). Second, with the “exogenous” revenues, the government can mollify dissent through a variety of mechanisms (buying off critics, providing the population with benefits, infrastructure projects, patronage or outright graft).

70
Rodrik, Dani (1999a) ‘Where did all the growth go? External shocks, social conflict, and growth collapses’ Journal of Economic Growth 4(4): 385-412
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=30074
    Prefix
    There is no question that the manufactures exporters appear to 15 These “institutional” variables that have been used recently in a set of papers on the institutional determinants of economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1995;
    Exact
    Rodrik 1999a, Kaufmann et al. 2000;
    Suffix
    Dollar 2000, Ritzen, Easterly and Woolcock 2000, and Easterly 2001). Growth rate data for the period 1957-1997 was compiled have higher institutional quality—the indicator is lower among the resource-exporter countries in all cases and for six of these this difference is statistically significant 16 .

73
Ross, Michael (1999) ‘The political economy of the resource curse’ World Politics 51(1): 297322
Total in-text references: 1
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    Prefix
    of economic 5 Columbine-tantalite (Col-tan) has recently been declared ‘the wonder mineral of the moment’: when processed, it is vital for the manufacture of capacitors and other high tech products. 6 The most recent literature on the effects of natural resources on growth includes Auty 1995; 2001; Leamer et al 1999; Leite and Weidmann 1999;
    Exact
    Ross 1999, 2001;
    Suffix
    Sachs and Warner 1995 [2000], 1999; Stijns 2001; Nugent and Robinson 2001; Gylfason and Zoega 2002, Lederman and Maloney 2002. growth since the “commodity shocks” of the 1970s and 1980s (Rodrik 1999), but that institutional capacity itself varies across economies with different sources of export revenue, and that it is these export structures that influences socioeconomic and political

74
Ross, Michael (2001) ‘Does oil hinder democracy?’ World Politics 53(3): 325-61
Total in-text references: 3
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=5001
    Prefix
    have promised that oil revenues will go to schools, hospitals and roads, no formal plans are in the offing; meanwhile, neighboring Caspian Sea nations are despotically ruled, ethnically divided, and weakened by corruption—problems some fear will be made worse by oil4. The controversy over the construction of the pipeline in Chad 1 Cited in
    Exact
    Ross (2001
    Suffix
    : 329, fn. 6) 2 Karl (1997: 13) 3 Bates (2001: 107, fn. 1) 4 According to the chief UN representative in Azerbaijan, “This wealth ... will create a lot of problems. It will increase the already substantial gap between the rich and poor, and eventually it will affect political stability” (Kinzer 1999). demonstrates that even in an extraordinarily poor country, not all believe that ad

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=7408
    Prefix
    of economic 5 Columbine-tantalite (Col-tan) has recently been declared ‘the wonder mineral of the moment’: when processed, it is vital for the manufacture of capacitors and other high tech products. 6 The most recent literature on the effects of natural resources on growth includes Auty 1995; 2001; Leamer et al 1999; Leite and Weidmann 1999;
    Exact
    Ross 1999, 2001;
    Suffix
    Sachs and Warner 1995 [2000], 1999; Stijns 2001; Nugent and Robinson 2001; Gylfason and Zoega 2002, Lederman and Maloney 2002. growth since the “commodity shocks” of the 1970s and 1980s (Rodrik 1999), but that institutional capacity itself varies across economies with different sources of export revenue, and that it is these export structures that influences socioeconomic and political

  3. In-text reference with the coordinate start=10619
    Prefix
    All of these are consistent with a negative link between particular types of resources and government capacity. Rentier States. Political scientists generally—and area specialists in particular—argue that certain natural resources undermine development through what they term “rentier effects”
    Exact
    (Ross 2001)
    Suffix
    7 . When revenues can be easily extracted from a few sources that are easily 7 Some historians of the early modern state (e.g., Chirot, 1998) argue that the increasing cost of modern armies led to greater demands on the state’s ability to raise revenues, which led to one of several outcomes.

79
Sokoloff, Kenneth and Stanley Engerman (2000) ‘Institutions, factor endowments, and paths of development in the New World’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 217-32
Total in-text references: 1
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    Prefix
    Migdal 1988).9 Entrenched Inequality. The “entrenched inequality” effect is that the export composition affects economic and political outcomes by affecting the social structure. Economic historians Engerman and
    Exact
    Sokoloff (1997, 2000)
    Suffix
    argue that the diverging growth trajectories of South and North America over the last two hundred years can be explained by reference to the types of crops grown, the extent of property rights regimes enacted to secure their sale, and the timing and nature of colonization.

80
Stijns, Jean-Philippe (2001) ‘Natural resource abundance and economic growth revisited’
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=7461
    Prefix
    5 Columbine-tantalite (Col-tan) has recently been declared ‘the wonder mineral of the moment’: when processed, it is vital for the manufacture of capacitors and other high tech products. 6 The most recent literature on the effects of natural resources on growth includes Auty 1995; 2001; Leamer et al 1999; Leite and Weidmann 1999; Ross 1999, 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995 [2000], 1999;
    Exact
    Stijns 2001;
    Suffix
    Nugent and Robinson 2001; Gylfason and Zoega 2002, Lederman and Maloney 2002. growth since the “commodity shocks” of the 1970s and 1980s (Rodrik 1999), but that institutional capacity itself varies across economies with different sources of export revenue, and that it is these export structures that influences socioeconomic and political institutions.

89
Wade, Robert (1988) Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South
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    Prefix
    World Bank (1998) illustrated the power of institutions in development assistance, and what donors should (and most importantly, should not) do in the face of varied institutional performance among potential aid recipients. Our results suggest how entrenched—and ‘environmentally determined’—poor institutions can be (cf.
    Exact
    Wade (1988),
    Suffix
    at micro level). So these results, in a certain sense, further raise cautions about casual attempts at institutional reform. Poor institutions are deeply rooted. Where others (e.g., Rodrik 1999) have shown how important institutional quality and social inclusion are to managing growth generally and growth volatility in particular, these results push the chain of causation back further one st

94
World Bank (1998) Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why New York: Oxford
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    Prefix
    guilds and choral societies, it is hard to imagine how a policymaker interested in accelerating growth can change what we have identified as one possible underlying cause of poor performance—a country’s natural resource endowment makes for poor institutions. We admit: it is hard to get beyond this first glance. But here’s why we think it is important to shed light on these results.
    Exact
    World Bank (1998)
    Suffix
    illustrated the power of institutions in development assistance, and what donors should (and most importantly, should not) do in the face of varied institutional performance among potential aid recipients.

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World Bank (2002) ‘New data on property rights and rule based governance’. Available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators.htm (as CPIA)
Total in-text references: 2
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    Prefix
    2.85 * 2.80 2.89 2.81 Quality of the Bureaucracy 3.71 2.59 ** 2.52 2.63 2.55 Freedom Political rights 3.98 3.28 3.50 3.26 3.12 House Civil Liberties 3.56 3.35 3.49 3.33 3.24 CPIA Property rights and rulebased governance 3.60 3.37 3.53 3.28 3.42 Notes: The sources for these institutional variables are Kaufmann et al. (2000) (for KKZ), Easterly (2000) (for ICRG and Freedom House) and
    Exact
    World Bank (2002)
    Suffix
    (for CPIA). * significant at 5% level and ** significant at 1% level for Mann-Whitney test of similar distributions in resource-poor and resource-exporter countries. from the Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators (Worl

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=32059
    Prefix
    distributions in resource-poor and resource-exporter countries. from the Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators (World Bank 1999). Measures of social and political data were adapted from Kaufmann et al. (2002)15,
    Exact
    Easterly (2000), and World Bank (2002).
    Suffix
    16 From the KKZ data, ‘rule of law’, ‘political instability’, ‘government effectiveness’, and ‘control of corruption’; from ICRG, ‘law and order tradition’ and ‘quality of the bureaucracy.’ IV.