The 42 references with contexts in paper Michele Ruta, Anthony J. Venables (2012) “International Trade in Natural Resources: Practice and Policy” / RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3778

1
Allsopp C, Fattouh B. 2011. Oil and international energy. Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 27:33-67
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    (rail-road distribution monopoly in the US prior to 1878 and OPEC post 1972) and changing expectations about long run growth (the transformation of the US economy in the 19 th century and the Asian economy in the late 20 th and 21st centuries). This line of argument is consistent with others. Kilian (2011) suggests that increasing demand explains the 2003-08 oil price shock.
    Exact
    Allsopp and Fattouh (2011)
    Suffix
    point to increased uncertainty about future non-OECD demand, as well as supply factors, meaning that the long-run price ‘anchor’ has disappeared. In summary then, while understanding of resource price behaviour remains incomplete, the emerging consensus is that changes are driven by fundamentals.

2
Almoguera P, Douglas C, Herrera A. 2011. Testing for the cartel in OPEC; non-cooperative collusion or just non-cooperative? Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 27:33-67
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    Econometric studies fall into two types, one estimating the impact of OPEC on price, and others looking for other aspects of cartel behaviour. Early price studies found evidence of collusive behaviour, particularly for the period up to 1983 (see Griffin 1985), although little effect for later periods. A recent study
    Exact
    (Almoguera et al 2011)
    Suffix
    identifies periods in which OPEC behaviour is and is not collusive (using both a measure based on comparison of quota and actual output, and one using estimated break points). Collusion holds for about one-third of the period, and during collusive periods prices are significantly higher (predicted increase of 69% over non-collusion) and OPEC production lower (by 11%).

3
Anderson K, Martin W. 2011. Export Restrictions and Price Insulation during Commodity Price Booms. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5645.
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    Prefix
    Coady et al. suggest that ‘tax-inclusive subsidies’, calculated as the subsidy relative to a situation where a 30c per litre gasoline tax is imposed, are running at $720bn pa or 1.0% of global GDP. 14 Export restrictions, including export taxes, prohibitions, quotas, have also been widely used in food sectors in recent times
    Exact
    (Anderson and Martin, 2011; Bouet and Laborde, 2010; Headey, 2011;
    Suffix
    among others). In the period 2008-10 approximately 87 new restrictions were implemented in these sectors, covering a share of world trade in food staples such as wheat and rice that reached 14% and 35% respectively (Giordani et al. 2011).

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=57605
    Prefix
    However, the joint imposition of higher export taxes and lower import tariffs (or higher import subsidies) contracts world supply and expands world demand, thus resulting in even higher international food prices.
    Exact
    Anderson and Martin (2011) and Bouet and Laborde (2010)
    Suffix
    provide evidence of this effect. Finally, what is the scale of the microeconomic inefficiency induced by tariff and tax policies? Cross-country variation in consumers’ marginal valuations of gasoline are more than 2:1 within the OECD (over $2 per litre in much of Europe, 95c in the US, IEA Sept 2011) extending to 4:1 once some oil producers are included (Malaysia, 61c, Indonesia 51c).

4
Bagwell K, Staiger RW. 1999. An Economic Theory of GATT. The American Economic Review, 89:215-248
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    However, achieving this deal would require action by both importers and exporters (Collier and Venables, 2010).19 The asymmetries that characterize WTO rules, between export and import policy and between domestic and trade measures, limit the ability of countries to escape these inefficiencies. As shown by
    Exact
    Bagwell and Staiger (1999)
    Suffix
    in the case of a terms-of-trade externality and by Ossa (2011) for a production relocation externality, the fundamental GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination help governments internalize the negative cross-border effects that they impose on each other.

7
Bouet A, Laborde G. 2010. Economics of Export Taxation in the Context of food Crisis: A Theoretical and CGE Approach Contribution. International Food Policy Research
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=41530
    Prefix
    Coady et al. suggest that ‘tax-inclusive subsidies’, calculated as the subsidy relative to a situation where a 30c per litre gasoline tax is imposed, are running at $720bn pa or 1.0% of global GDP. 14 Export restrictions, including export taxes, prohibitions, quotas, have also been widely used in food sectors in recent times
    Exact
    (Anderson and Martin, 2011; Bouet and Laborde, 2010; Headey, 2011;
    Suffix
    among others). In the period 2008-10 approximately 87 new restrictions were implemented in these sectors, covering a share of world trade in food staples such as wheat and rice that reached 14% and 35% respectively (Giordani et al. 2011).

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=57605
    Prefix
    However, the joint imposition of higher export taxes and lower import tariffs (or higher import subsidies) contracts world supply and expands world demand, thus resulting in even higher international food prices.
    Exact
    Anderson and Martin (2011) and Bouet and Laborde (2010)
    Suffix
    provide evidence of this effect. Finally, what is the scale of the microeconomic inefficiency induced by tariff and tax policies? Cross-country variation in consumers’ marginal valuations of gasoline are more than 2:1 within the OECD (over $2 per litre in much of Europe, 95c in the US, IEA Sept 2011) extending to 4:1 once some oil producers are included (Malaysia, 61c, Indonesia 51c).

9
Brander J, Taylor MS. 1997. International Trade and Open Access Renewable Resources: The
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=18439
    Prefix
    There is a substantial literature on the dynamic effects of international trade in renewable resources such as forestry or fish. Several studies point out that, when resources suffer from open access problems that result from weak property rights, trade may exacerbate the depletion of the resource
    Exact
    (Chichilnisky, 1994, Brander and Taylor, 1997, 1998, Karp et al. 2001).
    Suffix
    6 However, Copeland and Taylor (2009) argue that trade pessimism may be overstated. The strength of the property rights regime depends on a variety of factors, including the ability of a government to monitor supplies, the technology for harvesting and for regulating, and the economic benefits from poaching the resource.

11
Brander J, Taylor MS, 1998. Open Access Renewable Resources: Trade and Trade Policy in a
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=18439
    Prefix
    There is a substantial literature on the dynamic effects of international trade in renewable resources such as forestry or fish. Several studies point out that, when resources suffer from open access problems that result from weak property rights, trade may exacerbate the depletion of the resource
    Exact
    (Chichilnisky, 1994, Brander and Taylor, 1997, 1998, Karp et al. 2001).
    Suffix
    6 However, Copeland and Taylor (2009) argue that trade pessimism may be overstated. The strength of the property rights regime depends on a variety of factors, including the ability of a government to monitor supplies, the technology for harvesting and for regulating, and the economic benefits from poaching the resource.

13
Coady D, Gillingham R, Ossowski R, Piotrowski J, Tareq S, Tyson J. 2010. Petroleum product subsidies; costly, inequitable and rising. IMF SPN/10/05, Washington DC
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  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=41183
    Prefix
    The political economy case for oil exporters to use such policies can be strong, particularly in societies where citizens see no other benefit from their resource wealth. The scale of such subsidies on petroleum has been estimated to be running at some $250 billion pa
    Exact
    (Coady et al. 2010).
    Suffix
    Coady et al. suggest that ‘tax-inclusive subsidies’, calculated as the subsidy relative to a situation where a 30c per litre gasoline tax is imposed, are running at $720bn pa or 1.0% of global GDP. 14 Export restrictions, including export taxes, prohibitions, quotas, have also been widely used in food sectors in recent times (Anderson and Martin, 2011; Bouet and Laborde, 2010; Headey, 2011;

14
Chichilnisky G. 1994. North-South Trade and the Global Environment. American Economic Review. 84:851-74
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=18439
    Prefix
    There is a substantial literature on the dynamic effects of international trade in renewable resources such as forestry or fish. Several studies point out that, when resources suffer from open access problems that result from weak property rights, trade may exacerbate the depletion of the resource
    Exact
    (Chichilnisky, 1994, Brander and Taylor, 1997, 1998, Karp et al. 2001).
    Suffix
    6 However, Copeland and Taylor (2009) argue that trade pessimism may be overstated. The strength of the property rights regime depends on a variety of factors, including the ability of a government to monitor supplies, the technology for harvesting and for regulating, and the economic benefits from poaching the resource.

15
Collier P. 2010. The Plundered Planet; why we must--and how we can--manage nature for global prosperity. OUP, Oxford.
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    All parties could be better off if government had a commitment technology, which restricted its freedom to alter fiscal or contractual terms. It has been suggested that the efficiency loss associated with this market failure is significant.
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    Collier (2010)
    Suffix
    suggests that the value of sub-soil assets per square kilometre discovered in Sub-Saharan Africa is just one-fifth the value of sub-soil assets remaining in OECD countries. This is unlikely to be geological bad luck, and is much more likely to indicate the scale to which exploration and development in African has been deterred by these concerns.

16
Collier P, Venables AJ. 2010. International rules for trade in natural resources. Journal of Globalization and Development. vol 1, issue 1.
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    Prefix
    It therefore follows that in the situation described above in which export taxes raise no revenue, neither would import tariffs. A general equilibrium formulation of conditions under which this holds is given in
    Exact
    Collier and Venables (2010).
    Suffix
    Intuition can be seen by considering a special case in which all foreign exchange earnings come from a perfectly inelastic supply of resource exports and accrue to government; demand for foreign exchange depends on the domestic price of imports relative to the price of domestic output.

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=61578
    Prefix
    Reaching such a deal, in which world prices were gradually harmonized, would be entirely analogous to the mutual de-escalation of tariff wars which has been the core function of the WTO since its foundation. However, achieving this deal would require action by both importers and exporters
    Exact
    (Collier and Venables, 2010).
    Suffix
    19 The asymmetries that characterize WTO rules, between export and import policy and between domestic and trade measures, limit the ability of countries to escape these inefficiencies. As shown by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) in the case of a terms-of-trade externality and by Ossa (2011) for a production relocation externality, the fundamental GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and non-discrimi

  3. In-text reference with the coordinate start=72421
    Prefix
    A suggestion to address these problems is to extend the role of the WTO in the enforcement of resource extraction agreements, thereby giving governments a way of committing themselves to fiscal and contractual terms
    Exact
    (Collier and Venables, 2010).
    Suffix
    Efficient allocation of contracts requires a process analogous to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle of the WTO. This principle is concerned to avoid discriminatory tariff wedges that disadvantage some suppliers relative to others.

18
Copeland BR, Taylor MS. 2009. Trade, Tragedy and the Commons. American Economic Review. 99:725-49
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=18522
    Prefix
    Several studies point out that, when resources suffer from open access problems that result from weak property rights, trade may exacerbate the depletion of the resource (Chichilnisky, 1994, Brander and Taylor, 1997, 1998, Karp et al. 2001). 6 However,
    Exact
    Copeland and Taylor (2009)
    Suffix
    argue that trade pessimism may be overstated. The strength of the property rights regime depends on a variety of factors, including the ability of a government to monitor supplies, the technology for harvesting and for regulating, and the economic benefits from poaching the resource.

19
Corden WM. 1966. The Structure of Tariff System and the Effective Rate of Protection. Journal of Political Economy,.74:221-237
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    Furthermore, sectors where tariff escalation is sizable are typically activities that have a high share of resource inputs (and low share of value added) in gross output, so that effective protection rates are high even if nominal rates are low. There are several reasons why tariff escalation in developed countries matters. First, as
    Exact
    Corden (1966)
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    put it, "an escalated structure biases trade in favor of raw materials against processed products" (Corden, 1966, page 229). Second, advanced economies represent the biggest market for developing resource rich countries.

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=50107
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    There are several reasons why tariff escalation in developed countries matters. First, as Corden (1966) put it, "an escalated structure biases trade in favor of raw materials against processed products"
    Exact
    (Corden, 1966,
    Suffix
    page 229). Second, advanced economies represent the biggest market for developing resource rich countries. Hence, tariff escalation lowers the ability of the latter to diversify their export base. Furthermore, one reason often advanced by resource rich countries to motivate the use of export taxes is to redress the tariff escalation that they face in export markets, an issue that we will disc

20
Corden WM, Neary JP. 1982. Booming sector and de-industrialisation in a small open economy.
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    Prefix
    effects when the sectors that are crowded out by resource exports could have positive spillovers, such as learning by doing or economies of scale, on the rest of the economy (van Wijnbergen, 1984, Krugman, 1987, Sachs and Warner, 1995). While later studies have shown that the real exchange rate may not necessarily increase in response to an expansion of the natural resource sector (e.g.
    Exact
    Corden and Neary, 1982, Torvik, 2001),
    Suffix
    the empirical literature is generally supportive of the predictions of the Dutch disease hypothesis. Sachs and Werner (1995) find that resource rich economies have slower growth in manufacturing exports; Stijns (2003) shows that the price-led energy booms tend to systematically hurt energy exporters’ real manufacturing trade.7 It is also important to note that trade in resources is often not

22
Dasgupta PS, Heal GM. 1979. Economic theory and exhaustible resources. CUP Cambridge.
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    Tariff rates are higher for developing countries, ranging from 15.1% to 6.0%, but they are still well below tariff protection for merchandise trade as a 15 It may be profitable, but not time-consistent, to choose to leave some of the resource in the ground indefinitely. 16 See for example
    Exact
    Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
    Suffix
    Marginal revenue is a fixed proportion of price if the demand curve for the resource is iso-elastic. For a nice survey of the issues see Gaudet (2007). whole. However, it does not follow from this that importers are policy inactive.

23
Davis G. 2010. Trade in mineral resources. WTO Working Paper ERSD-2010-01.
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  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=19646
    Prefix
    A first set of studies, summarized in Kemp and Long (1984), look at whether the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory are sustained in a setting à la Hotelling (1931) where producers take into account the opportunity cost of depleting the resource. This approach, however, neglects some salient features of markets for finite resources, such as their imperfectly competitive nature
    Exact
    (Davis, 2010).
    Suffix
    A second set of studies abstracts from the determinants of international trade and focuses more narrowly on the exporters' optimal extraction path under imperfect competition. As this is essentially a policy choice, we return to it in section 3.2. 5 This is an obvious implication of the Heckscher-Ohlin model.

24
Dvir H, Rogoff K. 2009. The three epochs of oil. NBER Working Paper No. 14927.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=29088
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    However, given a very low elasticity of demand, the required scale of inventory change is correspondingly small. A more complete understanding of the interaction between markets comes from thinking about the expectations of traders.
    Exact
    Dvir and Rogoff (2009)
    Suffix
    look at the impact of different demand shocks and show how the asset (and inventory holding) side of the market may increase volatility. If there is a positive shock to the level of demand which is transient (largest in the current period and decaying over time) then inventories will act to reduce the variance of prices: they are run down in the first period as physical supply is moved to the

25
Gaudet G. 2007. Natural resource economics under the rule of Hotelling. Canadian Journal of Economics. 40:1033–1059
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=48633
    Prefix
    protection for merchandise trade as a 15 It may be profitable, but not time-consistent, to choose to leave some of the resource in the ground indefinitely. 16 See for example Dasgupta and Heal (1979). Marginal revenue is a fixed proportion of price if the demand curve for the resource is iso-elastic. For a nice survey of the issues see
    Exact
    Gaudet (2007).
    Suffix
    whole. However, it does not follow from this that importers are policy inactive. Two sorts of policies are in place: tariff escalation and domestic taxation. Tariff escalation Just as resource exporters may seek to attract downstream activities by using resource export taxes, so resource importers may seek to attract these activities by offering tariff protection.

28
Guzman A. 1998. Why LDCs sign treaties that hurt them: explaining the popularity of Bilateral
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=72029
    Prefix
    First, differences in bargaining power can be large in bilateral arrangements. Such differences skew the distribution of rent in favour of the stronger party. This is often seen as lowering the gains that resource rich governments can achieve by signing a BIT
    Exact
    (Guzman, 1998).
    Suffix
    Second, the extent to which the hold-up problem is effectively solved depends on the credibility of the arbitration system offered by the specific arrangement. A suggestion to address these problems is to extend the role of the WTO in the enforcement of resource extraction agreements, thereby giving governments a way of committing themselves to fiscal and contractual terms (Collier and Venabl

30
Hamilton JD. 2008. Understanding crude oil prices. Working paper, UCSD.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=25472
    Prefix
    One fundamental reason for large price swings is low price elasticities. Estimates of the elasticity of demand for oil are extremely low, with short run price elasticities estimated in the range 0.05 – 0.3 and long run elasticities 0.2 – 0.9
    Exact
    (Hamilton 2008, 2009).
    Suffix
    Supply into the spot market has also been estimated to have low price elasticity, for example the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) use a short run elasticity of 0.02 and long run 0.1 (see Smith 2009).

31
Hamilton JD. 2009. Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, 215-259.
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=24353
    Prefix
    While the causes of volatility are not necessarily international, its consequences are particularly severe because of the asymmetric impact of price fluctuations on different countries. Oil price shocks were one of the major drivers of recessions in the US
    Exact
    (Hamilton 2009),
    Suffix
    although there is evidence that their impact is diminishing; a 10% increase in the price of oil was estimated to reduce US GDP by 0.7% over a 2-3 period prior to 1984, but just 0.25% after 1984 (Blanchard and Gali 2007), a number consistent with recent cross-country work by Rasmussen and Roitman (2011).

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=25472
    Prefix
    One fundamental reason for large price swings is low price elasticities. Estimates of the elasticity of demand for oil are extremely low, with short run price elasticities estimated in the range 0.05 – 0.3 and long run elasticities 0.2 – 0.9
    Exact
    (Hamilton 2008, 2009).
    Suffix
    Supply into the spot market has also been estimated to have low price elasticity, for example the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) use a short run elasticity of 0.02 and long run 0.1 (see Smith 2009).

32
Headey D. 2011. Rethinking the Global Food Crisis: The Role of Trade Shocks. Food Policy. 36: 136-46
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=41530
    Prefix
    Coady et al. suggest that ‘tax-inclusive subsidies’, calculated as the subsidy relative to a situation where a 30c per litre gasoline tax is imposed, are running at $720bn pa or 1.0% of global GDP. 14 Export restrictions, including export taxes, prohibitions, quotas, have also been widely used in food sectors in recent times
    Exact
    (Anderson and Martin, 2011; Bouet and Laborde, 2010; Headey, 2011;
    Suffix
    among others). In the period 2008-10 approximately 87 new restrictions were implemented in these sectors, covering a share of world trade in food staples such as wheat and rice that reached 14% and 35% respectively (Giordani et al. 2011).

33
Hotelling H. 1931. The economics of exhaustible resources. Journal of Political Economy. 39:137-175
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=19414
    Prefix
    The literature on trade in non-renewable resources, such as fuels and minerals, is more fragmented and reaches less clear-cut conclusions. A first set of studies, summarized in Kemp and Long (1984), look at whether the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory are sustained in a setting à la
    Exact
    Hotelling (1931)
    Suffix
    where producers take into account the opportunity cost of depleting the resource. This approach, however, neglects some salient features of markets for finite resources, such as their imperfectly competitive nature (Davis, 2010).

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=46346
    Prefix
    For exhaustible resources, changes in the international terms of trade are likely to be accompanied by changes in the inter-temporal terms of trade. Since the resource is exhaustible extracting less today means extracting more at some later date.15 The benchmark model for thinking about this is that of
    Exact
    Hotelling (1931),
    Suffix
    in which the equilibrium of price-taking producers has unit rent (price minus unit extraction cost) rising at the rate of interest. While the rate of interest sets the change in the price, the initial level of the price path is such that cumulative demand for the resource leads to its eventual complete depletion.

36
Ivanic M, Martin W, Mattoo A. 2011. Welfare and Price Impacts of Price Insulating Policies.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=42036
    Prefix
    While the intent of governments may well be to offset consumers' losses in the face of high and increasing world food prices, export restrictions are often ineffective in insulating domestic markets
    Exact
    (Ivanic et al. 2011) and
    Suffix
    exacerbate volatility of world food prices, an issue that we discuss further below. Downstream production. The benefits of lower prices accrue not only to households, but also to downstream users or processors of the resource.

38
Jones WO. 1987. Food-Crop Marketing Boards in Tropical Africa. The Journal of Modern
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=40618
    Prefix
    The most extreme of this has arisen in agriculture, where export taxes have been widely employed, in part to provide funds for governments. The distortionary effect has been massive, as exemplified by the experience of the African marketing boards
    Exact
    (Jones 1987).
    Suffix
    Transfers to households. A second motive for using export taxes arises as they reduce the domestic price of the resource to domestic consumers. The clearest example is export taxes on fuel, equivalent to fuel subsidies, reducing the domestic price relative to the world price.

40
Karp L, Sacheti S, Zhao J. 2001. Common ground between free-traders and environmentalists.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=18439
    Prefix
    There is a substantial literature on the dynamic effects of international trade in renewable resources such as forestry or fish. Several studies point out that, when resources suffer from open access problems that result from weak property rights, trade may exacerbate the depletion of the resource
    Exact
    (Chichilnisky, 1994, Brander and Taylor, 1997, 1998, Karp et al. 2001).
    Suffix
    6 However, Copeland and Taylor (2009) argue that trade pessimism may be overstated. The strength of the property rights regime depends on a variety of factors, including the ability of a government to monitor supplies, the technology for harvesting and for regulating, and the economic benefits from poaching the resource.

42
Kemp MC, Long NV. 1984. The Role of Natural Resources in Trade Models. In Handbook of
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=19298
    Prefix
    It may lead to increased monitoring effort or higher penalties for poaching, both of which would strengthen the property rights regime and limit resource depletion. The literature on trade in non-renewable resources, such as fuels and minerals, is more fragmented and reaches less clear-cut conclusions. A first set of studies, summarized in
    Exact
    Kemp and Long (1984),
    Suffix
    look at whether the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory are sustained in a setting à la Hotelling (1931) where producers take into account the opportunity cost of depleting the resource. This approach, however, neglects some salient features of markets for finite resources, such as their imperfectly competitive nature (Davis, 2010).

45
Krugman P. 1987. The narrow moving band, the Dutch disease, and the competitive consequences of Mrs. Thatcher: Notes on trade in the presence of dynamic scale economies. Journal of Development Economics. 27: 41-55
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=21271
    Prefix
    A number of studies have shown that this tendency can have negative effects when the sectors that are crowded out by resource exports could have positive spillovers, such as learning by doing or economies of scale, on the rest of the economy (van Wijnbergen, 1984,
    Exact
    Krugman, 1987, Sachs and Warner, 1995).
    Suffix
    While later studies have shown that the real exchange rate may not necessarily increase in response to an expansion of the natural resource sector (e.g. Corden and Neary, 1982, Torvik, 2001), the empirical literature is generally supportive of the predictions of the Dutch disease hypothesis.

46
Latina J, Piermartini R, Ruta M. 2011. Natural resources and non-cooperative trade policy.
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=52905
    Prefix
    Furthermore, they have motives to use them (although we have questioned the extent to which the revenue argument is applicable for resource exporters, and pointed to the trade-off between current and future terms of trade for exhaustible resource exporters). The use of these instruments results in an inefficient policy equilibrium
    Exact
    (Latina et al 2011).
    Suffix
    Trade measures (a tariff on the downstream sector or an export tax on the resource) and domestic measures (a tax on resource consumption in the importing country or a production quota in the exporting economy) have a negative impact on the welfare of trading partners.

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=63225
    Prefix
    the mechanisms of the WTO, than as part of wide-ranging and ad hoc negotiations on countering climate change. negotiated policy concessions by eliminating incentives to reverse them in the future. The very fact that significant measures that affect resources trade are outside the scope of the WTO, therefore, makes it difficult to eliminate these inefficiencies within the current system
    Exact
    (Latina et al. 2011).
    Suffix
    These considerations have important implications in the context of the Doha negotiations and of the broader discussion on the future agenda of the WTO. In the current trade talks, countries have moved towards the possible application of the so-called Swiss formula to cut import tariffs, which implies a reduction of tariff escalation. 20 On the export side, however, taxes are not under negotia

48
Leamer E. 1984. Source of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=20022
    Prefix
    A second set of studies abstracts from the determinants of international trade and focuses more narrowly on the exporters' optimal extraction path under imperfect competition. As this is essentially a policy choice, we return to it in section 3.2. 5 This is an obvious implication of the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
    Exact
    Leamer (1984) and
    Suffix
    Trefler (1995) find results consistent with the predictions of this theory. More recently, variables such as education, infrastructure and institutions have also been observed to affect sectoral patterns of natural resources trade (Lederman and Xu 2007).

51
Ossa R. 2011. A "New Trade" Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations. Journal of Political Economy 119:122-152
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=61881
    Prefix
    However, achieving this deal would require action by both importers and exporters (Collier and Venables, 2010).19 The asymmetries that characterize WTO rules, between export and import policy and between domestic and trade measures, limit the ability of countries to escape these inefficiencies. As shown by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) in the case of a terms-of-trade externality and by
    Exact
    Ossa (2011)
    Suffix
    for a production relocation externality, the fundamental GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination help governments internalize the negative cross-border effects that they impose on each other.

52
Piermartini R. 2004. The Role of Export Taxes in the Field of Primary Commodities. WTO
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=43456
    Prefix
    resource rich economy can justify the use of export restrictions to promote 14 Coady et al. select 30c per litre as a representative estimate of optimal gasoline taxes, based in revenue considerations and externalities related to congestion, accidents, and pollution. domestic downstream production, this strategy has a number of drawbacks
    Exact
    (Piermartini, 2004).
    Suffix
    First, export taxes, as other forms of subsidisation, may encourage the development of inefficient industries that will depend on government subsidies to survive in the market. Second, while often justified as a tool to improve resource sustainability, export restrictions may have negative environmental effects as they replace foreign demand with higher demand by the domestic processing sector

54
Radetzki M. 2008. Producer cartels in international commodity markets. in Radetzki, M. (ed) A Handbook of Primary Commodities in the Global Economy, [8] New York: Cambridge
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  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=45907
    Prefix
    But for a large enough producer – or producer cartel – export taxes or equivalent quantity restrictions may increase the world price of the good and thereby redistribute rent towards the producer country. This terms of trade manipulation has been attempted by many primary commodity cartels, most of which have been unsuccessful (see
    Exact
    Teece et al. 1993, Radetzki 2008).
    Suffix
    An important cartel is OPEC, which regulates the overall quantity produced by member countries. For exhaustible resources, changes in the international terms of trade are likely to be accompanied by changes in the inter-temporal terms of trade.

56
Rasmussen T, Roitman A. 2011. Oil shocks in a global perspective: are they really that bad?
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  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=24644
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    Oil price shocks were one of the major drivers of recessions in the US (Hamilton 2009), although there is evidence that their impact is diminishing; a 10% increase in the price of oil was estimated to reduce US GDP by 0.7% over a 2-3 period prior to 1984, but just 0.25% after 1984 (Blanchard and Gali 2007), a number consistent with recent cross-country work by
    Exact
    Rasmussen and Roitman (2011).
    Suffix
    For resource exporters, particularly developing countries, price instability has been one of the major factors leading to the ‘resource curse’. Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2009) test the direct impact of natural resource abundance on economic growth and its indirect effects through volatility of unanticipated output growth.

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Sachs JD, Warner AM. 1995. Natural resource abundance and economic growth, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 5398.
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    A number of studies have shown that this tendency can have negative effects when the sectors that are crowded out by resource exports could have positive spillovers, such as learning by doing or economies of scale, on the rest of the economy (van Wijnbergen, 1984,
    Exact
    Krugman, 1987, Sachs and Warner, 1995).
    Suffix
    While later studies have shown that the real exchange rate may not necessarily increase in response to an expansion of the natural resource sector (e.g. Corden and Neary, 1982, Torvik, 2001), the empirical literature is generally supportive of the predictions of the Dutch disease hypothesis.

60
Smith JL. 2009. World oil: Market or mayhem? Journal of Economic Perspectives. 23:145-164
Total in-text references: 3
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=25685
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    Estimates of the elasticity of demand for oil are extremely low, with short run price elasticities estimated in the range 0.05 – 0.3 and long run elasticities 0.2 – 0.9 (Hamilton 2008, 2009). Supply into the spot market has also been estimated to have low price elasticity, for example the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) use a short run elasticity of 0.02 and long run 0.1 (see
    Exact
    Smith 2009).
    Suffix
    Clearly, with such low elasticities, relatively small supply or demand shocks translate into large price changes.8 8 See Smith (2009) for some examples.

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=25869
    Prefix
    Supply into the spot market has also been estimated to have low price elasticity, for example the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) use a short run elasticity of 0.02 and long run 0.1 (see Smith 2009). Clearly, with such low elasticities, relatively small supply or demand shocks translate into large price changes.8 8 See
    Exact
    Smith (2009)
    Suffix
    for some examples. However, the supply side of the market is complicated by many factors including suppliers’ monopoly power, and the fact that oil and other natural resources are non-renewable assets.

  3. In-text reference with the coordinate start=55649
    Prefix
    Smith (2005) concludes that ‘OPEC is much more than a non-cooperative oligopoly, but less than a frictionless cartel (i.e. multi-plant monopoly)’. Econometric studies need to be assessed in conjunction with commentary by industry experts. In the view of
    Exact
    Smith (2009)
    Suffix
    OPEC has failed to cut production from existing oil wells, except in the period 1973-75 (and, unintentionally, following the Iranian revolution in 1979). But it has succeeded in restricting the growth of capacity and development of new fields, this contributing to current high prices and a situation where high extraction cost non-OPEC oil is coming to replace low extraction cost oil from unde

61
Sterner T. 2007. Fuel taxes: An important instrument for climate policy. Energy Policy, 35:31943202.
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  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=58810
    Prefix
    Since CO2 emissions have a global effect on climate change, the shadow price of emissions should be the same in all countries. The quantitative impact of moving to an equal price is demonstrated in
    Exact
    Sterner (2007), and
    Suffix
    IEA (2009) estimates that simply reducing tax-inclusive subsidies by 50% would reduce total greenhouse gas emissions by 14-17% by 2050. We also argued that policy had been used to relocate downstream production, through use of export taxes and importers’ tariff escalation.

62
Stijns J.-P. 2003. An empirical test of the Dutch disease hypothesis using a gravity model of trade. EconWPA, International Trade Series no. 0305001.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=21707
    Prefix
    Corden and Neary, 1982, Torvik, 2001), the empirical literature is generally supportive of the predictions of the Dutch disease hypothesis. Sachs and Werner (1995) find that resource rich economies have slower growth in manufacturing exports;
    Exact
    Stijns (2003)
    Suffix
    shows that the price-led energy booms tend to systematically hurt energy exporters’ real manufacturing trade.7 It is also important to note that trade in resources is often not just spot-trade in the commodity, but also involves longer-term international contracts.

63
Stroupe WJ. 2006. The New World Oil Order: Russian Attacks the West's Achilles' Heel. Asia Times.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=22367
    Prefix
    Historically, these included long-term contracts between producer and consumer countries in energy commodities, such as oil and natural gas, and in metals, such as copper, aluminium and iron ore. Over time, these bilateral supply contracts have been complemented and sometimes replaced by trading on organized markets, as exemplified by the evolution of the market for crude oil
    Exact
    (Stroupe 2006).
    Suffix
    The preponderant form of these longer term contracts are now exploration and production contracts between resource extraction companies and host governments. These are a form of foreign direct investment (FDI), but are quite distinctive in so far as the government is the ultimate owner of the resource that is extracted and long term arrangements – royalties, taxes, and possibly production sh

64
Teece D, Sunding D, Mosakowski E. 1993. Natural resource cartels. in Kneese AV, Sweeney JL. (eds) , Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics Vol III, Elsevier: 1131-1166.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=45907
    Prefix
    But for a large enough producer – or producer cartel – export taxes or equivalent quantity restrictions may increase the world price of the good and thereby redistribute rent towards the producer country. This terms of trade manipulation has been attempted by many primary commodity cartels, most of which have been unsuccessful (see
    Exact
    Teece et al. 1993, Radetzki 2008).
    Suffix
    An important cartel is OPEC, which regulates the overall quantity produced by member countries. For exhaustible resources, changes in the international terms of trade are likely to be accompanied by changes in the inter-temporal terms of trade.

65
Torvik R. 2001. Learning by doing and the Dutch disease. European Economic Review. 45:285306
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=21464
    Prefix
    effects when the sectors that are crowded out by resource exports could have positive spillovers, such as learning by doing or economies of scale, on the rest of the economy (van Wijnbergen, 1984, Krugman, 1987, Sachs and Warner, 1995). While later studies have shown that the real exchange rate may not necessarily increase in response to an expansion of the natural resource sector (e.g.
    Exact
    Corden and Neary, 1982, Torvik, 2001),
    Suffix
    the empirical literature is generally supportive of the predictions of the Dutch disease hypothesis. Sachs and Werner (1995) find that resource rich economies have slower growth in manufacturing exports; Stijns (2003) shows that the price-led energy booms tend to systematically hurt energy exporters’ real manufacturing trade.7 It is also important to note that trade in resources is often not

66
Turner A, Farrimond J, Hill J. 2011. The oil trading markets, 2003-10: analysis of market behaviour and possible policy responses. Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 27:33-67 van der Ploeg F. 2011. Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? Journal of Economic Literature, 49:366–420. va
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=28609
    Prefix
    However, a price increase in the futures market will raise price in the spot market only if the quantity supplied to the spot market is reduced; this operates through an increase in inventories, as the commodity is held back for future rather than current delivery. There is no evidence that 9
    Exact
    Turner, Farrimond and Hill (2011).
    Suffix
    Of course, oil is only consumed once but trades can take place multiple times in a year. inventories increased during the price spikes of recent years, this suggesting that pure speculation was not a force.