The 2 references with contexts in paper Simon Johnson, John McMillan, Christopher Woodruff (1999) “Contract Enforcement in Transition” / RePEc:ces:ceswps:_211

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Hendley, Kathryn, Ickes, Barry W., Ryterman, Randi, and Murrell, Peter, “Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises,” Post-Soviet Affairs 13 (1), 1997, 19-41.
Total in-text references: 2
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    Managers say disputes with trading partners are usually settled without third-party assistance. But the law also matters, despite these countries’ incomplete laws and inadequate courts and collection mechanisms (Hay and Shleifer, 1998;
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    Hendley et al., 1997).
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    The courts had been used by 39% of the surveyed firms involved in a recent dispute with a trading partner. To the question of whether the courts could be used to enforce contracts, even if the firm had never had a dispute, more than two-thirds answered that they could. 2 We find that relational contracting supports trade credit when (a) the supplier has obtained information about the customer fro

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    The survey was administered to 1471 firms, yielding 2942 potential manufacturercustomer relationships. After excluding state-owned customers, foreign customers, and those 18
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    Hendley et al. (1997)
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    suggest that private enforcement and court enforcement may complement each other: "Private enforcers often review relevant legal documentation before acting." The model of Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) gives another rationale for the courts and relational contracts to be complementary: it is possible for imperfect formal contracting to crowd out relational contracting and cause a welfare loss.

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Wall Street Journal, Central European Economic Review,1998
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    of lawyers in the region, shows differences among the countries: Poland scored 4+, Slovakia, Romania and Russia scored 3, and Ukraine scored 2.6 The Wall Street Journal’s panel of investment professionals rates the countries as of the end of 1997 according to an index of the rule of law. Poland scored 9.0 on a scale of one to ten, Romania scored 6.4, Slovakia 6.2, Russia 5.4, and Ukraine 3.9
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    (Wall Street Journal, 1998).
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    The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom for 1997, also the result of evaluation by outside experts (Johnson, Holmes and Kirkpatrick 1998), in terms of property rights put Poland ahead with a score of 2, Slovakia and Russia scored 3, Romania and Ukraine scored 4.7 The picture from these measures of the legal environment is therefore fairly consistent.