The 20 references with contexts in paper Catherine Roux, Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg (2007) “Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus” / RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1995

1
Aubert C., Kovacic W. and Rey P. (2003):The Impact of Leniency Programs on Cartels, forthcoming in the International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Total in-text references: 1
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    the colluding companies under investigation, spontaneously disclosed a simultaneously existing illegal agreement between Luxembourg brewers though it could not benefit from an additional fine discount in the Belgian Beer market, e.g. for particularly extensive cooperation, as it would under US Amnesty Plus (EC IP/01/1739 December 2001, EC IP/01/1740 December 2001). 6 academic research - such as
    Exact
    Harrington (2005), Aubert, Kovacic and Rey (2003), Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2003) and Hinloopen (2002)
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    - has elaborated on the differences in conception of leniency programs and their impact on the efficacy of antitrust enforcement8. However, no economic research has been conducted on how Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus influence firms’ cartel activities.

2
Barboza D. (10 October 1999):A Tearing Down the Fa ̧cade of ‘Vitamins Inc.’, New York Times, Section 3, pp.1.
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    However, instead of assisting the DoJ in its inquiries, not only did HLR’s top executives, engaged in the citric acid conspiracy and holding at the same time important responsibilities in the vitamin business, boldly deny any knowledge of, or participation in, a vitamin cartel, but also they sharply increased their efforts to conceal illegal arrangements
    Exact
    (Hammond 2000, Barboza 1999).
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    In 1997, shortly after ADM had plead guilty for criminal price fixing in citric acid, HLR and Jungbunzlauer AG (JBL) agreed to plea-bargain and to pay fines totaling $25 million. At the same time, ADM and JBL engaged in price fixing and market sharing in sodium gluconate (EC IP/01/1743 December 2001).

3
Bernheim B. D. and Whinston M. D. (1990):Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.21, No.1, pp.1-26.
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=15865
    Prefix
    On the other hand, our analysis is motivated by the study of how multimarket contact affects the degree of cooperation among firms. Literature on collusion in a multimarket context started with the seminal paper of
    Exact
    Bernheim and Whinston (1990).
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    Our analysis is closest in purpose to current economic leniency literature in that we attempt to assess how the design of leniency programs affects cartel stability. Recent 6Under the US Amnesty Program, only the first reporting firm is eligible to full immunity from fines.

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    However, since greater desistance makes collusion less profitable, desistance is pertinent to deterrence and thereby enhances ex ante deterrence (Harrington 2005). 8For an extensive overview of economic literature on leniency programs see Spagnolo (2005). 7 Our analysis has essentially been inspired by
    Exact
    Bernheim and Whinston (1990)
    Suffix
    who build on the idea, first raised by Edwards (1955) and further developed in a finite oligopoly games context by Harrington (1987), that multimarket contact across firms could foster anticompetitive outcomes.

4
Connor J. M. (2003):International Price Fixing: Resurgence and Deterrence, Purdue University, mimeo.
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  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=7786
    Prefix
    Available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm 21996 Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, OJ C 207, 18 July 1996. 3 In the US, convictions of global cartels in the 1990s suggest that at least a dozen firms have become repeated offenders in related product industries
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    (Connor 2003).
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    The DoJ has been investigating around 50 alleged international cartels in 2004, and half of them have been detected during inquiries on separate markets (Hammond 2004). These so-called ‘rolling investigations’ and ‘cartel profiling’ techniques are the DoJ’s response to companies’ recidivism.

5
Connor J. M. (2000):Archer Daniels Midland: Price-Fixer to the World, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics, mimeo.
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=4026
    Prefix
    The initial success of these arrangements inspired their replication in other vitamin markets. In these second-wave cartels, firms such as e.g. Merck, Takeda and Daiichi, simultaneously colluding in at least one other vitamin, joined the pioneers
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    (Connor 2000,
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    EC IP/01/1625 November 2001). While Rhˆone-Poulenc’s disclosure of evidence on collusion in the vitamin A and E markets made the cartel’s wall of silence crumble, only BASF’s comprehensive collaboration with the US Department of Justice (DoJ) under the Amnesty Plus Program accelerated inquiries and finally led to the successful prosecution of all participants.

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=6737
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    Thus, the investigation in lysine directly yielded information on the citric acid collusion. The illegal price-fixing and market sharing agreements in lysine were initiated by ADM in 1992 and discovered by the public in 1995
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    (Connor 2000,
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    EC IP/00/589 June 2000). Besides ADM were involved its Asian rivals Ajinomoto, Cheil, Kyowa and Sewon. In 1996, the Asian lysine producers plead guilty and agreed to cooperate with the DoJ and to testify against ADM in return for lenient treatment.

8
Edwards C. D. (1955):Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, In Business Concentration and Proce Policy, NBER conference report, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=19884
    Prefix
    However, since greater desistance makes collusion less profitable, desistance is pertinent to deterrence and thereby enhances ex ante deterrence (Harrington 2005). 8For an extensive overview of economic literature on leniency programs see Spagnolo (2005). 7 Our analysis has essentially been inspired by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) who build on the idea, first raised by
    Exact
    Edwards (1955) and
    Suffix
    further developed in a finite oligopoly games context by Harrington (1987), that multimarket contact across firms could foster anticompetitive outcomes. The authors show that strategically linking markets weakly increases cartel profits because it slackens the incentive constraints that limit firms’ ability to sustain collusive behavior in settings of repeated interactions.

9
Feess E. and Walzl M. (2004):An Analysis of Corporate Leniency Programs and Lessons to Learn for US and EU Policies, Research Memoranda 039, METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
Total in-text references: 1
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    Moreover, the focus of the study is on the strictness of leniency programs reflecting the likelihood of getting full immunity from fines even in case many firms self-report simultaneously and hence, it fundamentally differs from ours. Another noteworthy difference from the above literature is that, in our model, cartels do not take the form of ongoing criminal relations. This is in line with
    Exact
    Feess and Walzl (2004)
    Suffix
    who build a static model and Spagnolo (2000) who examines one-shot market interactions. Although our model is static, the intuition behind the results is likely to apply also to dynamic environments. Finally, most of the leniency literature focuses on the potential of leniency programs to deter collusion ex ante.

10
Hammond S. D. (2006):Measuring the Value of Second-In Cooperation in Corporate Plea Negotiations, The 54th Annual American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting, March 29, 2006.
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=10449
    Prefix
    for its executives4. 3The size of the additional discount mainly depends on three factors: The strength of the evidence provided by the cooperating company, the potential significance of the revealed case measured in terms of volume of commerce involved, geographic scope and the number of co-conspirators, and the likelihood that the DoJ would have detected the cartel absent self-reporting
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    (Hammond 2006).
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    4The DoJ does not state an exact percentage increase in the case of Penalty Plus but asserts to pursue a fine or jail sentence at or above the upper end of the Guidelines Range (Hammond 2006). An example of Penalty Plus is the DoJ’s fining decision in monochloracetic acid in 2003.

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    Prefix
    the revealed case measured in terms of volume of commerce involved, geographic scope and the number of co-conspirators, and the likelihood that the DoJ would have detected the cartel absent self-reporting (Hammond 2006). 4The DoJ does not state an exact percentage increase in the case of Penalty Plus but asserts to pursue a fine or jail sentence at or above the upper end of the Guidelines Range
    Exact
    (Hammond 2006).
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    An example of Penalty Plus is the DoJ’s fining decision in monochloracetic acid in 2003. The German company Hoechst AG was fined roughly 130% above the minimum guideline fine due to its failure to report the illegal agreement in monochloracetic acid at the time it was convicted for its participation in the sorbates cartel (Hammond 2004). 4 Under the current EC Leniency Notice, Amnesty Plus and Pen

11
Hammond S. D. (2004):Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program, presented at the ICN Workshop on Leniency Programs, Sydney, November 22-23, 2004.
Total in-text references: 3
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    from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, OJ C 207, 18 July 1996. 3 In the US, convictions of global cartels in the 1990s suggest that at least a dozen firms have become repeated offenders in related product industries (Connor 2003). The DoJ has been investigating around 50 alleged international cartels in 2004, and half of them have been detected during inquiries on separate markets
    Exact
    (Hammond 2004).
    Suffix
    These so-called ‘rolling investigations’ and ‘cartel profiling’ techniques are the DoJ’s response to companies’ recidivism. With the objective of fully exploiting these patterns of contagious conspiracies, the DoJ implemented the Amnesty - respectively Penalty Plus Program in 1999 as part of the Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy (Spratling 1999).

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    According to Hammond, “The Division’s Amnesty Plus program creates an attractive inducement for encouraging companies who arealready under investigation to report the full extent of their antitrust crimes [. . .].”
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    (Hammond 2004
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    :16). Leniency programs reduce fines for cartel members that bring evidence to the antitrust authority. Amnesty refers to the complete exemption from fines. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus comprise proactive strategies aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging subjects of ongoing investigations to consider whether they qualify for amnesty in other than currently inspected markets whe

  3. In-text reference with the coordinate start=10976
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    The German company Hoechst AG was fined roughly 130% above the minimum guideline fine due to its failure to report the illegal agreement in monochloracetic acid at the time it was convicted for its participation in the sorbates cartel
    Exact
    (Hammond 2004).
    Suffix
    4 Under the current EC Leniency Notice, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus do not exist. Although, in 2001, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommended the inclusion of Amnesty Plus as part of the 2002 reforms of the EC Leniency Program5, the EC did not seize the opportunity to follow the US example by introducing a similar policy.

12
Hammond S. D. (2000):Fighting Cartels - Why and How? Lessons Common to Detecting and Deterring Cartel Activity, presented at the 3rd Nordic Competition Policy Conference, Stockholm, September 12, 2000. 20
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=5870
    Prefix
    However, instead of assisting the DoJ in its inquiries, not only did HLR’s top executives, engaged in the citric acid conspiracy and holding at the same time important responsibilities in the vitamin business, boldly deny any knowledge of, or participation in, a vitamin cartel, but also they sharply increased their efforts to conceal illegal arrangements
    Exact
    (Hammond 2000, Barboza 1999).
    Suffix
    In 1997, shortly after ADM had plead guilty for criminal price fixing in citric acid, HLR and Jungbunzlauer AG (JBL) agreed to plea-bargain and to pay fines totaling $25 million. At the same time, ADM and JBL engaged in price fixing and market sharing in sodium gluconate (EC IP/01/1743 December 2001).

13
Harrington J. E. (2005):Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs, mimeo, Departement of Economics, John Hopkins University.
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=16748
    Prefix
    the colluding companies under investigation, spontaneously disclosed a simultaneously existing illegal agreement between Luxembourg brewers though it could not benefit from an additional fine discount in the Belgian Beer market, e.g. for particularly extensive cooperation, as it would under US Amnesty Plus (EC IP/01/1739 December 2001, EC IP/01/1740 December 2001). 6 academic research - such as
    Exact
    Harrington (2005), Aubert, Kovacic and Rey (2003), Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2003) and Hinloopen (2002)
    Suffix
    - has elaborated on the differences in conception of leniency programs and their impact on the efficacy of antitrust enforcement8. However, no economic research has been conducted on how Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus influence firms’ cartel activities.

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=19661
    Prefix
    We presume that cartels have already been formed and instead concentrate on the issue of ex post desistance. However, since greater desistance makes collusion less profitable, desistance is pertinent to deterrence and thereby enhances ex ante deterrence
    Exact
    (Harrington 2005).
    Suffix
    8For an extensive overview of economic literature on leniency programs see Spagnolo (2005). 7 Our analysis has essentially been inspired by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) who build on the idea, first raised by Edwards (1955) and further developed in a finite oligopoly games context by Harrington (1987), that multimarket contact across firms could foster anticompetitive outcomes.

14
Harrington J. E. (1987):Collusion in Multiproduct Oligopoly Games under a Finite Horizon, International Economic Review, Vol.28, No.1, pp.1-14.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=19959
    Prefix
    less profitable, desistance is pertinent to deterrence and thereby enhances ex ante deterrence (Harrington 2005). 8For an extensive overview of economic literature on leniency programs see Spagnolo (2005). 7 Our analysis has essentially been inspired by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) who build on the idea, first raised by Edwards (1955) and further developed in a finite oligopoly games context by
    Exact
    Harrington (1987),
    Suffix
    that multimarket contact across firms could foster anticompetitive outcomes. The authors show that strategically linking markets weakly increases cartel profits because it slackens the incentive constraints that limit firms’ ability to sustain collusive behavior in settings of repeated interactions.

15
Hinloopen J. (2002):The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs under European Style Antitrust Legislation, mimeo, University of Amsterdam.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=16748
    Prefix
    the colluding companies under investigation, spontaneously disclosed a simultaneously existing illegal agreement between Luxembourg brewers though it could not benefit from an additional fine discount in the Belgian Beer market, e.g. for particularly extensive cooperation, as it would under US Amnesty Plus (EC IP/01/1739 December 2001, EC IP/01/1740 December 2001). 6 academic research - such as
    Exact
    Harrington (2005), Aubert, Kovacic and Rey (2003), Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2003) and Hinloopen (2002)
    Suffix
    - has elaborated on the differences in conception of leniency programs and their impact on the efficacy of antitrust enforcement8. However, no economic research has been conducted on how Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus influence firms’ cartel activities.

17
Jephcott (2002):The European Commission’s New Leniency Notice - Whistling the Right Tune, European Competition Law Review, Vol.23, No.8, pp.378-385.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=13587
    Prefix
    Finally, we add Penalty Plus and show not only that our results still hold but also that Penalty Plus may even strengthen our findings. The study of the possible impact of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on firms’ incentives to self-report has been exclusively left to legal scholars.
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    Jephcott (2002)
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    is first to highlight the lack of an equivalent to the US Amnesty Plus option in the 2002 5Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, 2002/C 45/03, 19 February 2002.

18
McElwee D. (2004):Should the European Commission Adopt ’Amnesty Plus’ in its Fight Against Hard-Core Cartels?, European Competition Law Review, Vol.25, No.9, pp.558-565.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=13898
    Prefix
    Jephcott (2002) is first to highlight the lack of an equivalent to the US Amnesty Plus option in the 2002 5Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, 2002/C 45/03, 19 February 2002. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/leniency/. 5 EC Leniency Notice.
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    McElwee (2004)
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    argues that Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus intensify the ‘race to the courtroom’ dynamics6and thus generate distrust among cartel members. Moreover, companies volunteering information on their participation in other cartels during an investigation on a distinct product or geographic market appear to be rare.

20
Motta M. and Polo M. (2003):Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.21, pp.347-379.
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=15630
    Prefix
    Section 7 concludes. 2 Related Literature The enforcement problem we study essentially relates to two different strands of literature. On the one hand, our paper is embedded in the analysis of how the design of leniency programs influences the internal stability of collusive agreements involving a group of violators, pioneered by
    Exact
    Motta and Polo (2003).
    Suffix
    On the other hand, our analysis is motivated by the study of how multimarket contact affects the degree of cooperation among firms. Literature on collusion in a multimarket context started with the seminal paper of Bernheim and Whinston (1990).

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=16748
    Prefix
    the colluding companies under investigation, spontaneously disclosed a simultaneously existing illegal agreement between Luxembourg brewers though it could not benefit from an additional fine discount in the Belgian Beer market, e.g. for particularly extensive cooperation, as it would under US Amnesty Plus (EC IP/01/1739 December 2001, EC IP/01/1740 December 2001). 6 academic research - such as
    Exact
    Harrington (2005), Aubert, Kovacic and Rey (2003), Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2003) and Hinloopen (2002)
    Suffix
    - has elaborated on the differences in conception of leniency programs and their impact on the efficacy of antitrust enforcement8. However, no economic research has been conducted on how Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus influence firms’ cartel activities.

21
Spagnolo (2005):Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust, presented at the C.E.P.R. Conference of “Competition Policy for International Development, Growth and Trade”, Brussels, December 9-10, 2005, prepared for P. Buccirossi (Ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, forthcoming in 2006 with M.I.T. Press.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=19754
    Prefix
    However, since greater desistance makes collusion less profitable, desistance is pertinent to deterrence and thereby enhances ex ante deterrence (Harrington 2005). 8For an extensive overview of economic literature on leniency programs see
    Exact
    Spagnolo (2005).
    Suffix
    7 Our analysis has essentially been inspired by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) who build on the idea, first raised by Edwards (1955) and further developed in a finite oligopoly games context by Harrington (1987), that multimarket contact across firms could foster anticompetitive outcomes.

22
Spagnolo G. (2003):Divide et Impera: Optimal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels and Organized Crime, mimeo, C.E.P.R., University of Mannheim.
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=16748
    Prefix
    the colluding companies under investigation, spontaneously disclosed a simultaneously existing illegal agreement between Luxembourg brewers though it could not benefit from an additional fine discount in the Belgian Beer market, e.g. for particularly extensive cooperation, as it would under US Amnesty Plus (EC IP/01/1739 December 2001, EC IP/01/1740 December 2001). 6 academic research - such as
    Exact
    Harrington (2005), Aubert, Kovacic and Rey (2003), Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2003) and Hinloopen (2002)
    Suffix
    - has elaborated on the differences in conception of leniency programs and their impact on the efficacy of antitrust enforcement8. However, no economic research has been conducted on how Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus influence firms’ cartel activities.

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=17275
    Prefix
    However, no economic research has been conducted on how Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus influence firms’ cartel activities. Our model differs from conventional ones, where firms collude in one market only, in that we analyze firms’ simultaneous participation in several collusive agreements.
    Exact
    Spagnolo (2003),
    Suffix
    by modeling harsher fines for recidivist firms, is the only study on leniency programs which touches upon recidivism. In his analysis, higher sanctions for recurrent antitrust offenders rationalize the use of reduced fine schemes when firms follow an optimal two-phase punishment.

23
Spagnolo G. (2000):Self-Defeating Antitrust Laws: How Leniency Programs Solve Bertrand’s Paradox and Enforce Collusion in Auctions, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Nota Di Lavoro 52.2000.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=19128
    Prefix
    Another noteworthy difference from the above literature is that, in our model, cartels do not take the form of ongoing criminal relations. This is in line with Feess and Walzl (2004) who build a static model and
    Exact
    Spagnolo (2000)
    Suffix
    who examines one-shot market interactions. Although our model is static, the intuition behind the results is likely to apply also to dynamic environments. Finally, most of the leniency literature focuses on the potential of leniency programs to deter collusion ex ante.

24
Spratling G. R. (1999):Making Companies an Offer They Shouldn’t Refuse, The Antitrust Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy - An Update, Department of Justice.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=8301
    Prefix
    With the objective of fully exploiting these patterns of contagious conspiracies, the DoJ implemented the Amnesty - respectively Penalty Plus Program in 1999 as part of the Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy
    Exact
    (Spratling 1999).
    Suffix
    According to Hammond, “The Division’s Amnesty Plus program creates an attractive inducement for encouraging companies who arealready under investigation to report the full extent of their antitrust crimes [.