The 26 references with contexts in paper Christopher F. Baum, Mustafa Caglayan, Oleksandr Talavera (2009) “Parliamentary Election Cycles and the Turkish Banking Sector” / RePEc:boc:bocoec:705

3
Arena, M., 2008. Bank failures and bank fundamentals: A comparative analysis of Latin America and East Asia during the nineties using bank-level data. Journal of Banking & Finance 32 (2), 299–310.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=36476
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    System DPD combines equations in differences of the variables with equations in levels of the variables. In 12See, for instance, Demirg ̈u ̧c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Saunders and Schumacher (2000) or
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    Arena (2008).
    Suffix
    13Throughout the sample period, Turkey experienced recessions in 1979, 1980, 1994, 1999, and 2001, while a military coup took place in 1980–1982. Thanks to remittances from Turkish “guest workers” (gastarbeiters) in Germany and other European countries, the Turkish economy did not experience a downturn in the 1960s or early 1970s. 14Given the irregular timing of elections, it is not always possibl

4
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., Levine, R., 2000. Banking systems around the globe: Do regulation and ownership affect the performance and stability? Policy Research Working Paper Series 2325, The World
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=3913
    Prefix
    study by Molyneuxand Thornton (1992), who use a sample of European banks during 1986–1989, finds that government ownership has a positive 1Thede factonationalization of US and UK banks in the 2008 financial crisis stands in sharp contrast to those nations’ historical behavior. 2For instance, 32% of Turkish banking assets were controlledby the state in 2005. impact on bank profitability. Yet
    Exact
    Barth et al. (2000) and
    Suffix
    La Porta et al. (2002) provide evidence that state-owned banks are associated with lower economic growth. Similarly, Bongini et al. (2002) suggest that political connections may determine governments’ intervention to rescue failing banks.

6
Berger, A. N., Hasan, I., Zhou, M., 2009. Bank ownership and efficiency in China: What will happen in the world’s largest nation? Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (1), 113–130.
Total in-text references: 1
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    Prefix
    He also indicates that state bank loans are less likely to be repaid. Other researchers have shown that Chinese state-owned banks are less profitable, less efficient and have worse asset quality than other types of banks
    Exact
    (Lin and Zhang (2009), Berger et al. (2009)).
    Suffix
    Research on Turkish political business cycles also highlights the possibility of state-owned banks being used for the advancement of governments’ ambitions. Tutar and Tansel (2001) point out that during election periods both the budget deficit and lineitems of the budget are significantly negatively affected.

7
Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and momentrestrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 87, 115–143.
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=7990
    Prefix
    Hence, the data, collected and made available by the Banks Association of Turkey, are rich and consistent throughout the period of interest. We carry out our empirical analysis using the system dynamic panel data (DPD) estimator which combines equations in differences of the variables with equations in levels of the variables (see
    Exact
    Blundell and Bond (1998)).
    Suffix
    Our study differs from the earlier literature on several dimensions. First, our study provides a thorough investigation of all types of banks in Turkey overelection cycles rather than a knifeedge comparison of banks’ behavior between election versusnon-election years.

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=36968
    Prefix
    Thanks to remittances from Turkish “guest workers” (gastarbeiters) in Germany and other European countries, the Turkish economy did not experience a downturn in the 1960s or early 1970s. 14Given the irregular timing of elections, it is not always possible to include two years following the election year. this system GMM approach (see
    Exact
    Blundell and Bond (1998)),
    Suffix
    lagged levels are used as instruments for differenced equations and lagged differences are used as instruments for level equations. The models are estimated using a first difference transformationto remove the individual firm effect.

8
Bongini, P., Laeven, L., Majnoni, G., 2002. How good is the market at assessing bank fragility? A horse race between different indicators. Journal of Banking& Finance 26 (5), 1011–1028.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=4053
    Prefix
    1Thede factonationalization of US and UK banks in the 2008 financial crisis stands in sharp contrast to those nations’ historical behavior. 2For instance, 32% of Turkish banking assets were controlledby the state in 2005. impact on bank profitability. Yet Barth et al. (2000) and La Porta et al. (2002) provide evidence that state-owned banks are associated with lower economic growth. Similarly,
    Exact
    Bongini et al. (2002)
    Suffix
    suggest that political connections may determine governments’ intervention to rescue failing banks. Din ̧c (2005) investigates the effects of politicians’ influence on state-owned banks, concentrating on bank lending behavior.

9
Bonin, J. P., Hasan, I., Wachtel, P., 2005. Bank performance, efficiency and ownership in transition countries. Journal of Banking & Finance 29 (1), 31–53.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=31551
    Prefix
    To quantify the presence of differences between bank types and to determine whether election cycles have an impact on 11These observations, which prompted many researchers to advocate privatization programmes, are in line with the findings of
    Exact
    Bonin et al. (2005).
    Suffix
    In particular, they show that state-owned banks substantially underperform private-sector bank performance. bank behavior across bank types, we use a variant of a dynamicempirical specification proposed by earlier researchers.

12
Canevi, M. I., Cetinkaya, H., 2001. Has Turkey got its new banks act right? International Financial
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=23579
    Prefix
    We exclude non-state-owned investment banks and banks which have gone into administration.9We also drop banks with fewer than five years of available dataas they are either newly-chartered banks or banks that have been liquidated. In order to alleviate the influence of extreme observations, bank-level variables are denoted asmissing at the most extreme (top and 7See
    Exact
    Canevi and Cetinkaya (2001), Steinherr et al. (2004), Kibritcioglu (2005), and Yildirim (2008)
    Suffix
    for further information on banking in Turkey, bank regulation and its political background. 8As of January 2010, available at http://www.tbb.org.tr/english/ 9State-owned investment banks are included in our analysis (while private and foreign investment banks are excluded) as the state-owned investment banks’ lending activities may be fungible with those of their deposittaking counterparts. bottom

14
Clarke, G. R., Cull, R., Shirley, M. M., 2005. Bank privatization in developing countries: A summary of lessons and findings. Journal of Banking & Finance29 (8-9), 1905–1930.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=52578
    Prefix
    Although the state bank interest expense ratio is comparable to those of domestic and foreign-owned privatesector banks, the interest revenue ratios of state-owned banks are the lowest among all bank categories, rendering the interest margin minimal for the average state-owned bank. Given this finding, one may be tempted to recommend privatization of state-owned banks as
    Exact
    Clarke et al. (2005)
    Suffix
    suggest. However, while world financial markets go through hardships that have not been experienced since the Great Depression and while many private enterprises are nationalized throughout the world, privatization of state-owned banks is not somethingto be recommended at this time.17Yet it is advisable that state-owned banks should operate in a more transparent mode so as not to be subject to acc

15
Cole, S., 2009. Fixing market failures or fixing elections? Agricultural credit in India. American
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=6127
    Prefix
    Baum et al. (2008) find thatpolitically affiliated banks in Ukraine have significantly lower interest rate margins and that the level of activity of affiliated deputies in parliament has a positive impact on linked banks’ capitalization ratios.
    Exact
    Cole (2009),
    Suffix
    using data from India, shows that state bank credit is 5–10% higher in election years and even more so in heavily contested electoral districts. He also indicates that state bank loans are less likely to be repaid.

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=44595
    Prefix
    Given that Din ̧c’s results are based on cross-country panelregressions, it is possible that some influential outliers or the presence of accounting differences in reporting across countries may have 15Section 1.1 provides an overview of the inefficiencies that both developing and emerging countries face due to political pressures. More specifically see
    Exact
    Micco et al. (2007), Cole (2009), and
    Suffix
    Din ̧c (2005) who discuss how banks’ lending behavior during election periods may bend to political will. played a role in his findings. It is also possible that his results are driven by the choice of banks included in the regressions.16Equally, the time period during which he studied the phenomena may have an impact on his findings.

17
Denizer, C., 2000. Foreign entry in Turkey’s banking sector, 1980–97. Policy Research Working
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=21357
    Prefix
    For instance, Act No. 4491 gave the BRSA the rightto issue new banking permits, removing it from the the domain of the Council of Ministers. The BRSA had a clear objective 6For more detail on the Turkish banking system, see
    Exact
    Denizer (2000), Mercan et al. (2003),
    Suffix
    Alper and ̈Oni ̧s (2004), and Matousek et al. (2008). to rehabilitate and improve the performance of the banking system. Initially the agency was not immune to political pressures, but during and after the crisis of 2000–2001, its autonomy increased as it dealt with the problems of both private banks and state-owned banks.

19
Fraser, D. R., Zhang, H., Derashid, C., 2006. Capital structure and political patronage: The case of Malaysia. Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (4), 1291–1308.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=5618
    Prefix
    He also shows that firms pay lower interest rates in areas where the head of the local state-owned bank has the same party affiliation as the ruling political party. Using data from Pakistan, Khwaja and Mian (2005) provide evidence thatlow-quality borrowers with political connections can borrow from state-owned banks.
    Exact
    Fraser et al. (2006)
    Suffix
    suggest that Malaysian banks’ leverage is affected by the share of government ownership, informal ties to politicians, and the ownership share held by “institutional investors”,de factocontrolled by the government or government-sponsored agencies.

20
Hauner, D., 2008. Credit to government and banking sector performance. Journal of Banking & Finance 32 (8), 1499–1507.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=4780
    Prefix
    In a similar vein, Brown and Din ̧c (2005) show that prior to elections, failingbanks are less likely to be taken into administration. A recent study by Micco et al. (2007) pointsout that the performance of stateowned banks worsens during election years as they are influenced by political concerns. A broad cross-country study by
    Exact
    Hauner (2008)
    Suffix
    provides evidence of asignificant negative effect of credit to government in developing economies. Studies that concentrate on country-specific data on the behavior of lenders and borrowers also reveal that firms that have political ties with politicians are favored by state-owned banks.

21
Khwaja, A. I., Mian, A., 2005. Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (4), 1371–1411.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=5490
    Prefix
    Concentrating on Italian firms, he provides evidence that state-owned banks charge lower interest rates than do private sector banks. He also shows that firms pay lower interest rates in areas where the head of the local state-owned bank has the same party affiliation as the ruling political party. Using data from Pakistan,
    Exact
    Khwaja and Mian (2005)
    Suffix
    provide evidence thatlow-quality borrowers with political connections can borrow from state-owned banks. Fraser et al. (2006) suggest that Malaysian banks’ leverage is affected by the share of government ownership, informal ties to politicians, and the ownership share held by “institutional investors”,de factocontrolled by the government or government-sponsored agencies.

22
Kibritcioglu, A., 2005. Banking sector crises and related new regulations in Turkey. Macroeconomics 0505006, EconWPA.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=23579
    Prefix
    We exclude non-state-owned investment banks and banks which have gone into administration.9We also drop banks with fewer than five years of available dataas they are either newly-chartered banks or banks that have been liquidated. In order to alleviate the influence of extreme observations, bank-level variables are denoted asmissing at the most extreme (top and 7See
    Exact
    Canevi and Cetinkaya (2001), Steinherr et al. (2004), Kibritcioglu (2005), and Yildirim (2008)
    Suffix
    for further information on banking in Turkey, bank regulation and its political background. 8As of January 2010, available at http://www.tbb.org.tr/english/ 9State-owned investment banks are included in our analysis (while private and foreign investment banks are excluded) as the state-owned investment banks’ lending activities may be fungible with those of their deposittaking counterparts. bottom

23
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2002. Government ownership of banks. Journal of Finance 57 (1), 265–301.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=3940
    Prefix
    (1992), who use a sample of European banks during 1986–1989, finds that government ownership has a positive 1Thede factonationalization of US and UK banks in the 2008 financial crisis stands in sharp contrast to those nations’ historical behavior. 2For instance, 32% of Turkish banking assets were controlledby the state in 2005. impact on bank profitability. Yet Barth et al. (2000) and La
    Exact
    Porta et al. (2002)
    Suffix
    provide evidence that state-owned banks are associated with lower economic growth. Similarly, Bongini et al. (2002) suggest that political connections may determine governments’ intervention to rescue failing banks.

24
Lin, X., Zhang, Y., 2009. Bank ownership reform and bank performance in China. Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (1), 20–29.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=6503
    Prefix
    He also indicates that state bank loans are less likely to be repaid. Other researchers have shown that Chinese state-owned banks are less profitable, less efficient and have worse asset quality than other types of banks
    Exact
    (Lin and Zhang (2009), Berger et al. (2009)).
    Suffix
    Research on Turkish political business cycles also highlights the possibility of state-owned banks being used for the advancement of governments’ ambitions. Tutar and Tansel (2001) point out that during election periods both the budget deficit and lineitems of the budget are significantly negatively affected.

25
Matousek, R., Dasci, S., Sergi, B. S., 2008. The efficiency of the Turkish banking system during 2000–2005. International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies 1 (4), 341–355.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=21424
    Prefix
    For instance, Act No. 4491 gave the BRSA the rightto issue new banking permits, removing it from the the domain of the Council of Ministers. The BRSA had a clear objective 6For more detail on the Turkish banking system, see Denizer (2000), Mercan et al. (2003), Alper and ̈Oni ̧s (2004), and
    Exact
    Matousek et al. (2008). to
    Suffix
    rehabilitate and improve the performance of the banking system. Initially the agency was not immune to political pressures, but during and after the crisis of 2000–2001, its autonomy increased as it dealt with the problems of both private banks and state-owned banks.

26
Mercan, M., Reisman, A., Yolalan, R., Emel, A. B., 2003. The effect of scale and mode of ownership on the financial performance of the Turkish banking sector: Results of a DEA-based analysis.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=21357
    Prefix
    For instance, Act No. 4491 gave the BRSA the rightto issue new banking permits, removing it from the the domain of the Council of Ministers. The BRSA had a clear objective 6For more detail on the Turkish banking system, see
    Exact
    Denizer (2000), Mercan et al. (2003),
    Suffix
    Alper and ̈Oni ̧s (2004), and Matousek et al. (2008). to rehabilitate and improve the performance of the banking system. Initially the agency was not immune to political pressures, but during and after the crisis of 2000–2001, its autonomy increased as it dealt with the problems of both private banks and state-owned banks.

28
Micco, A., Panizza, U., Yanez, M., 2007. Bank ownership and performance. Does politics matter? Journal of Banking & Finance 31 (1), 219–241.
Total in-text references: 2
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=4602
    Prefix
    Using a large cross-country dataset, he finds evidence that state-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private sector banks. In a similar vein, Brown and Din ̧c (2005) show that prior to elections, failingbanks are less likely to be taken into administration. A recent study by
    Exact
    Micco et al. (2007)
    Suffix
    pointsout that the performance of stateowned banks worsens during election years as they are influenced by political concerns. A broad cross-country study by Hauner (2008) provides evidence of asignificant negative effect of credit to government in developing economies.

  2. In-text reference with the coordinate start=44595
    Prefix
    Given that Din ̧c’s results are based on cross-country panelregressions, it is possible that some influential outliers or the presence of accounting differences in reporting across countries may have 15Section 1.1 provides an overview of the inefficiencies that both developing and emerging countries face due to political pressures. More specifically see
    Exact
    Micco et al. (2007), Cole (2009), and
    Suffix
    Din ̧c (2005) who discuss how banks’ lending behavior during election periods may bend to political will. played a role in his findings. It is also possible that his results are driven by the choice of banks included in the regressions.16Equally, the time period during which he studied the phenomena may have an impact on his findings.

30
Sapienza, P., 2004. The effects of government ownership on bank lending. Journal of Financial Economics 72 (2), 357–384.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=5080
    Prefix
    A broad cross-country study by Hauner (2008) provides evidence of asignificant negative effect of credit to government in developing economies. Studies that concentrate on country-specific data on the behavior of lenders and borrowers also reveal that firms that have political ties with politicians are favored by state-owned banks.
    Exact
    Sapienza (2004)
    Suffix
    shows the effect of political connections on state-owned banks in Italy. Concentrating on Italian firms, he provides evidence that state-owned banks charge lower interest rates than do private sector banks.

31
Saunders, A., Schumacher, L., 2000. The determinants of bank interest rate margins: An international study. Journal of International Money and Finance 19(6), 813–832.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=36442
    Prefix
    We estimate the model with the one-step system dynamic paneldata (DPD) estimator. System DPD combines equations in differences of the variables with equations in levels of the variables. In 12See, for instance, Demirg ̈u ̧c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999),
    Exact
    Saunders and Schumacher (2000)
    Suffix
    or Arena (2008). 13Throughout the sample period, Turkey experienced recessions in 1979, 1980, 1994, 1999, and 2001, while a military coup took place in 1980–1982. Thanks to remittances from Turkish “guest workers” (gastarbeiters) in Germany and other European countries, the Turkish economy did not experience a downturn in the 1960s or early 1970s. 14Given the irregular timing of elections, it is n

32
Steinherr, A., Tukel, A., Ucer, M., 2004. The Turkish banking sector– Challenges and outlook in transition to EU membership. Economic and Financial Reports 2004/2, European Investment
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=23579
    Prefix
    We exclude non-state-owned investment banks and banks which have gone into administration.9We also drop banks with fewer than five years of available dataas they are either newly-chartered banks or banks that have been liquidated. In order to alleviate the influence of extreme observations, bank-level variables are denoted asmissing at the most extreme (top and 7See
    Exact
    Canevi and Cetinkaya (2001), Steinherr et al. (2004), Kibritcioglu (2005), and Yildirim (2008)
    Suffix
    for further information on banking in Turkey, bank regulation and its political background. 8As of January 2010, available at http://www.tbb.org.tr/english/ 9State-owned investment banks are included in our analysis (while private and foreign investment banks are excluded) as the state-owned investment banks’ lending activities may be fungible with those of their deposittaking counterparts. bottom

34
Taymaz, E., Yılmaz, K., 2008. Integration with the global economy: The case of Turkish automobile and consumer electronics industries. Tech. Rep. 0801,TUSIAD-Ko ̧c University Economic
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=16253
    Prefix
    Partially publicly traded Ko ̧cbank is owned by another powerful group, Ko ̧c Holding Company.5The number of foreign-owned private sector banks increased substantially after the country went through a programme of financial liberalization in the early 1980s. Currently, banks from various countries including the US, UK, 4See Turan (2003) on political developments and
    Exact
    Taymaz and Yılmaz (2008)
    Suffix
    on macroeconomic policies and performance, including the references therein. 5Yapı ve Kredi Bankası and Ko ̧cbank merged in 2008. Netherlands, Germany, and Greece operate in Turkey. Also, during the post-1980 period, several joint ventures were created, and two Islamic banks started trading in the financial markets.

36
Turan, I., 2003. Volatility in politics, stability in parliament: An impossible dream? The Turkish
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=16210
    Prefix
    Partially publicly traded Ko ̧cbank is owned by another powerful group, Ko ̧c Holding Company.5The number of foreign-owned private sector banks increased substantially after the country went through a programme of financial liberalization in the early 1980s. Currently, banks from various countries including the US, UK, 4See
    Exact
    Turan (2003)
    Suffix
    on political developments and Taymaz and Yılmaz (2008) on macroeconomic policies and performance, including the references therein. 5Yapı ve Kredi Bankası and Ko ̧cbank merged in 2008. Netherlands, Germany, and Greece operate in Turkey.

38
Tutar, I., Tansel, A., 2001. Political business cycles, institutional structure and budget deficits in Turkey. Working Papers 2019, METU–ERC.
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=6704
    Prefix
    Other researchers have shown that Chinese state-owned banks are less profitable, less efficient and have worse asset quality than other types of banks (Lin and Zhang (2009), Berger et al. (2009)). Research on Turkish political business cycles also highlights the possibility of state-owned banks being used for the advancement of governments’ ambitions.
    Exact
    Tutar and Tansel (2001)
    Suffix
    point out that during election periods both the budget deficit and lineitems of the budget are significantly negatively affected. Alper and ̈Oni ̧s (2004) claim that these ‘deficits reflect the existenceof powerful pressures for rent distribution as a major element of Turkey’s political economy in recent decades.

39
Yildirim, C., 2008. Moral hazard, corporate governance, and bank failure: evidence from the 2000–2001 Turkish crises. Tech. rep., mimeo. 19601970198019902000 year
Total in-text references: 1
  1. In-text reference with the coordinate start=23579
    Prefix
    We exclude non-state-owned investment banks and banks which have gone into administration.9We also drop banks with fewer than five years of available dataas they are either newly-chartered banks or banks that have been liquidated. In order to alleviate the influence of extreme observations, bank-level variables are denoted asmissing at the most extreme (top and 7See
    Exact
    Canevi and Cetinkaya (2001), Steinherr et al. (2004), Kibritcioglu (2005), and Yildirim (2008)
    Suffix
    for further information on banking in Turkey, bank regulation and its political background. 8As of January 2010, available at http://www.tbb.org.tr/english/ 9State-owned investment banks are included in our analysis (while private and foreign investment banks are excluded) as the state-owned investment banks’ lending activities may be fungible with those of their deposittaking counterparts. bottom